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[In the international law system, internal mechanisms are the appropriate responses to terrorist acts through domestic 
criminal law. The weakness of domestic criminal law is however evident in the face of transnational terrorists groups 
whose scope spreads across many borders. The challenge is compounded when States actively or passively support 
terrorism. Though traditionally State responsibility has been the vehicle through which pressure is exerted on States 
sponsoring terrorism, the lethal capabilities of terrorists demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 attacks has 
fundamentally changed the landscape. The consequences of breaches arising out of a failure by a State to effectively 
curtail terrorist organisations based or operating out of its territory have expanded sharply, permitting not just 
financial reparations or other traditional benign countermeasures, but even the extensive use of deadly military force. 
With the linkage between the terrorist and the sponsoring state becoming crucial to providing States with the 
justification for a response against rogues States, this Article discusses the issue of State-sponsored terrorism and the 
use of military force in combating terrorism in the context of the UN Charter regime on the use of force by States.]
I. Introduction
The term ‘terrorism’ is of French origin and was first coined in connection with the Jacobin 
‘Reign of Terror,’ a period of the bloody French Revolution in which the French State, asserted 
its authority by knitting a fabric of fear over the populace through summary executions of 
thousands.2 It was however not until the 20th century, in 1934, following the assassination of 
French statesman Jean-Louis Barthou and King Alexander of Yugoslavia that terrorism entered 
the international agenda.3 This event induced the League of Nations to draft the first ever penal 
instrument making terrorism an international offence-the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism.4 The Convention defined terrorism as ‘criminal acts directed against a 
State and intended or calculated to create a State of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a 
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2group of persons or the general public.’5 This Convention, which adopted a very broad definition 
of terrorism, never entered into force. Nevertheless, certain customary norms of international law 
relating to the use of armed force, most notably the duty of States ‘to prevent and suppress such 
subversive activity against foreign Governments as assumes the form of armed hostile 
expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property,’6 implicitly 
proscribed certain instances of terrorism.
After the World War II, the international community codified certain binding norms of 
international law in the United Nations Charter. The UN Charter has as its primary goal the 
prevention of war by working with the political system to govern conflicts between States by 
outlawing a wide range of uses of force and defining permissible and lawful uses of force.7 The 
Charter does not expressly mention terrorism. The drafters of the UN Charter ‘did not fully 
anticipate the existence, tenacity and technology of modern day terrorism’8 nor contemplate the 
existence of international terrorists with the result that the UN Charter simply does not directly 
address the subtler uses of force which terrorists began to actively pursue in the post-World War 
II period. 
The absence of an explicit recognition of terrorism was later matched by the absence of a single 
definition of terrorism in either customary or conventional international law. To date efforts by 
the United Nations to draft a single broad definition of terrorism acceptable to all States, such as 
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3that found in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, have failed.9
Conventional international law on terrorism is presently limited to a relatively small number of 
widely accepted conventions that proscribe particular types of terrorism, which likely reflect 
customary norms of international law.10 The most common types of terrorism covered by these 
conventions include crimes against the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation, the 
taking of hostages, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and crimes against internationally 
protected persons.11
During the early years of the UN the distinction between terrorists and revolutionaries12 was 
subject to much disagreement and the volatile Cold War era loomed large over any effort to 
establish a firm international definition of terrorism as it relates to States that sponsor or support 
terrorists. It was during this early days of the UN and the regime on the use of force that it sought 
to craft that the UN was presented with its greatest opportunity to bring terrorism within the 
ambit of the UN Charter through the key 1957 UN General Assembly resolution defining 
‘aggression’13 (as it relates to Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter). Sidestepping the 
9 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’ in Rosayln Higgins & Maurice Flory eds, 
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Law Journal 59, 92-94.
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4volatile issue, the UN chose to ignore using the word terrorism choosing instead to classify the 
activities of States who send, organize, or support ‘armed bands, groups, irregulars, or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against a State . . .’ as engaging in unlawful 
aggression in direct violation of the UN Charter and not as terrorism. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the United Nations attempts to define the term foundered mainly due to differences of 
opinion between various members about the use of violence in the context of conflicts over 
national liberation and self-determination. In spite of its failure to define terrorism, in 1985 the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted a key resolution: 
unequivocally condemn[ing], as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by 
whomever committed...[and calling]s upon all States to fulfil their obligations under international law to 
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other States, or 
acquiescing in activities within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts.14 [Emphasis 
added]
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence 
of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.... Article 2 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act 
of aggression.... 
Article 3 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall... qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State... of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State...; 
(c)  The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea, or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another 
State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State... in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or 
any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used 
by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; or, 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another State, of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein.
14
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5Similar language can be found in any number of subsequent General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions over the last fifteen years.15 Many of these resolutions also State that 
terrorism is contrary to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations and represents a 
‘threat to international peace and security’. Various definitions of terrorism refer to unlawful 
force as opposed to lawful force. However, the problem arises on the fundamental aspect of the 
definitions--the distinction between unlawful force and lawful force. ‘Recognizing the politics 
associated with reaching an acceptable global definition for terrorism, the United Nations (UN) 
has elected to avoid the term terrorism altogether, to use it in a general sense only, or to carefully 
carve out very specific acts in selected international treaties to characterise as terrorism.’16
Consequently, the international community has taken a piecemeal approach and addressed the 
problem of international terrorism by identifying particular criminal acts inherently terrorist in 
nature to be prevented and punished by domestic law. The result has been the adoption of a 
number of global treaties, regional conventions, and bilateral agreements, which are relevant to 
the suppression of international terrorism, and corresponding domestic laws, which implement 
those arrangements.17
Though terrorism is a term used frequently and has been extensively treated in legal literature for 
decades, there continues to be disagreement as to what might be an acceptable and universal 
15 See, e.g., GA Res 31-102, UN GAOR, 31st Sess, Supp No 39 at 185-186, UN A/31/39 (1976); GA Res 34-145, 
UN GAOR, 34th Sess, Supp No 46, at 244-245, UN A/34/46 (1980); GA Res 38-130, UN GAOR, 38th Sess, Supp 
No 47, at 266-267, UN A/38/47 (1983); GA Res 44-29, UN GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 49, at 301-303, UN A/44/49 
(1989); GA Res 46-51, UN GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 49 at 283-285, UN A/46/49 (1991); GA Res 51-210, UN 
GAOR, 51st Sess, Supp No 49 at 346-348, UN A/51/49 (1996); GA Res 53-108, UN GAOR, 53rd Sess, Supp No 49 
at 364-365, UN A/53/49 (1998); GA Res 56-160, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 49, at 358-359, UN A/56/49.
16
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6definition of the word. Despite the uncertainties, generally acts of violence that are considered 
objectively and intrinsically unlawful and without adequate justification amount to acts of
terrorism even though the terrorist group construe its activities within its political philosophy as a 
‘just cause’ under international law. Some basic features that might contribute to an acceptable 
and working definition can be gleaned from the following definitions which encapsulate various 
aspects of terrorism.
• ‘[T]he unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against 
individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for 
political or ideological purposes.’18
• ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.’19
• ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national 
groups or clandestine State agents.’20
• ‘violent criminal conduct apparently intended: (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to 
influence the conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a 
government by assassination or kidnapping.’21
Synthesising the aforementioned elements, terrorism can broadly be defined as: The use or 
threatened use of violence for political ends, or any use or threatened use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear, such force being distinguished 
by its unlawfulness under domestic and/or international law. This is broadly consistent with most 
definitions in academic literature which generally require two elements: actual or threatened 
violence against civilians or persons not actively taking part in hostilities and the implicit or 
explicit purpose of the act being to intimidate or compel a population, government or 
organisation into some course of action. This broad definition is supported by a proposed 
convention drafted by the International Law Association which defines terrorism as: 
18 US Department of Justice. Rushworth M Kidder, ‘Unmasking Terrorism: The Fear of Fear Itself’ in Bernard 
Schecterman & Martin Slann eds, Violence and Terrorism  (3rd  ed, 1993) 14.
19 US Federal Bureau of Investigation, ibid.
20 US Department of State, ibid.
21 US Department of Justice, ibid.
7An international terrorist offence is any serious act of violence or threat thereof by an individual whether 
acting alone or in association with other persons, organizations, places, transportation or communications 
systems or against members of the general public for the purpose of intimidating such persons, causing 
injury to or the death of such persons, disrupting the activities of such international organisations, of 
causing loss, detriment or damage to such places or property, or of interfering with such transportation and 
communications systems in order to undermine friendly relations among States or among the nationals of 
different States or to extort concessions from States.22 [Emphasis added]
In the words of Professor J F Addicott:
Despite the lack of a fixed universal agreement defining terrorism, the essential goal of terrorism is readily 
identifiable. As the root word implies, the goal of terrorism is to instil fear in a given civilian population 
by means of violence. In the oft-repeated Chinese proverb, the objective of the terrorist is to kill one and 
frighten 10,000. While specific acts of terrorism may appear to be mindless and irrational, terrorism is the 
antithesis of confused behaviour. Terrorism is a goal-directed, calculated, and premeditated use of force.23
International discourse on terrorism is abundant and terrorism continues to be the subject of 
sustained debate. However, the September 11, 2001 attacks elevated the discourse to another 
level through generation of momentum for the international legal system to co-opt military 
response to counter terrorism within the UN Charter on the regime of lawful use of force. Many 
of the strict requirements of Nicaragua Case24 which considered the issue of the State 
responsibility in light of international norms on the use of force are now under siege and have 
been opened to challenge. This points to an infusion of Article 51 with a new focus. This of itself 
is nothing new as discourse in this field has long grappled with the issue. This particular Article 
has as its aim an examination of the use of force to counter terrorism in light of the September 11 
attacks. It is premised on the central theme that the right to self-defence is visibly enrolled in a 
process of change and evaluates this within the framework of the uncertainty and indeterminacy 
22 Art I (J) of Draft Single Convention on the Legal Control of International Terrorism (International Law 
Association 1980) in International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference Held at Belgrade, August 
17th, 1980 to August 23rd, 1980, at 497-504 (1982). The traditional political offence exception commonly associated 
with extradition is not applicable in this definition of terrorist offence. See ibid at 502-3, commentary to art II.
23
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8of the role of the doctrine of State Responsibility in providing the necessary linkage to the use of 
military force against States that sponsor terrorism. 
In Part II, the Article will seek to set the parameters for State-sponsored terrorism through an 
evaluation of the tenets of State responsibility and UN Charter enshrined norms on the use of 
force. This is important since the potential for abuse of the option of military force is 
significantly reduced if States observe the evidentiary thresholds that relate to careful evaluation 
of evidence as to who is responsible for the attack. The recognition that acts of private actors may 
give rise to an armed attack is anything but revolutionary. However, it is not entirely clear from 
the practice in the aftermath of September 11 whether the requirement of the attributability of a 
terrorist act to a specific State actor was, in fact, fully abandoned or whether the qualification of 
armed attack still requires a nexus of the terrorist act to another State entity. Tied to this is the 
prickly issue of situations in which the attack is launched from failed States or territories 
governed by de facto regimes. 
In Part III, the Article analyses the UN Charter regime on the use of force specifically as it relates
to State-sponsored terrorism. This is an issue that continues to be on uncertain ground since under 
customary international law, States per se are not perpetrators of terrorism because terrorism is a 
penal offence and States are not subjects of international criminal law.25 Nonetheless, General 
Assembly resolutions that repeatedly condemn State undertaking and support of terrorism 
implicitly acknowledge that States are involved in terrorist activities.26 Within this context, the 
25 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, ‘Definition of Terrorism’ (1989) 19 Israel Year Book of Human Rights 39, 45.
26 See, e.g., GA Res 31-102, UN GAOR, 31st Sess, Supp No 39, at 185-186, UN Doc A/31/39 (1976); GA Res 34-
145, UN GAOR, 34th Sess, Supp No 46, at 244-245, UN Doc A/34/46 (1980); GA Res 38-130, UN GAOR, 38th 
Sess, Supp No 47, at 266-267, UN Doc A/38/47 (1983); GA Res 44-29, UN GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 49, at 301-
9Article discusses the relationship of armed attacks to terrorist attacks considering that it can be 
argued that terrorism is similar to conventional war insofar as they both have parallel goals and 
rationales, i.e., attacking the political, social or economic structures of a given State.27 The 
difference though is terrorists engage in violence against people who are not at war and who do 
not understand themselves to be at war. Considering that the relative lethalness of a given 
terrorist attack may vary in terms of the intensity and destructiveness of force deployed, ranging 
from the bombing of a small group to the large-scale slaughter of September 11, 2001, can 
terrorist attacks be co-opted into the understanding of ‘armed attack’ and thus a basis for the use 
of military force against the responsible entity?
Finally Part IV of the Article sums up the argument by considering the defensive response to 
state-sponsored terrorism and the dictates of customary and conventional legal requirements. 
Though the unspoken premise of the September 11 attacks is that terrorist groups shall not 
receive an ‘unwitting shield’ from the territorial integrity of a State, the normative corollary of 
this hypothesis which posits that the right to territorial integrity must, in some instances, yield to 
the exercise of another State’s right to protect itself and its citizens under the rubric of self-
defence may set a dangerous precedent. The quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the 
reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps are needed ought to be carefully weighed in an 
international system that is still dominated by the dictates of national and geopolitical interests.
303, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989); GA Res 46-51, UN GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 49, at 283-285, UN Doc A/46/49 
(1991); GA Res 51-210, UN GAOR, 51st Sess, Supp No 49, at 346-348, UN Doc A/51/49 (1996); GA Res 53-108, 
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess, Supp No 49, at 364-365, UN Doc A/53/49 (1998); GA Res 56-160, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, 
Supp No 49, at 358-359, UN Doc A/56/49 (2001) [hereinafter General Assembly Resolutions].
27 See Richard Falk, Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism (1988) 76, 90-93.
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II. Anatomy of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Historically, rules on the lawful use of force have developed within a framework of State-to-State 
relationships. ‘Terrorism’s uniqueness lies in its use of armed force against targets that would be 
exceptional or aberrational in regular warfare, with results that have little relationship to 
traditional military necessity.’28 ‘State involvement in terrorist activity is dictated by practical as 
well as ideological considerations. The strategic thinking involved incorporates the view that 
terrorism is a suitable substitute for traditional warfare when that warfare becomes too expensive 
or too risky. The construct of State support includes propaganda and political support, funding, 
intelligence, training, and supply of weapons at one end of the spectrum, and direct covert 
involvement at the other.’29
However, just like terrorism, the notion of State-sponsored terrorism lacks a universal definition 
partly because it traditionally fell in the realm of State responsibility and victim States then 
sought to enrol the countermeasures that the use of force affords. The confusion over a precise 
definition of State-sponsored terrorism is in large part reflective of the basic disagreement over 
the elements of terrorism itself. There are, however certain basic elements attendant to State-
sponsored terrorism: A politically subversive violent act or threat thereof; a State sponsor; an 
intended political outcome; and a target, whether civilian, military or material, whose death, 
injury or destruction can be expected to influence to some degree the desired political outcome. 
In defining State-sponsored terrorism, Cline and Alexander sum up this category thus: 
28
 Lieutenant Colonel James P Terry USMC, ‘Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis’ 
(1986) 36 Naval Law Review 159, 161.
29
 Ibid.
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The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign States (or sub-
national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign States) to attain strategic and political objectives by 
acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian 
or military victims attacked or threatened.30
State sponsorship of terrorism involves both acts of commission and omission. This can range 
from a State being directly behind the terrorist attacks, to less direct State involvement such as 
providing training, financing, or support one way or another, to even less direct State 
involvement by ‘tolerating,’ while not specifically supporting or approving, a particular terrorist 
group. Using a State’s territory as a location from which to launch terrorist attacks is something 
that, if tolerated, suggests that the State involved has in effect aided and abetted the terrorist 
group through tacit support or approval.’
From as far back as 1977, commentators suggested that the attempt ‘to hold States responsible in 
damages for the acts of terrorists when such acts can be attributed to them represents a strategic 
use of traditional international law norms which . . . may produce short-run benefits and …l 
contribute to long-run interests of the world community.’31 This position has been actively 
pursued by the International Law Commission (ILC)32 in its quest to codify customary 
international law relating to State responsibility. In its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts.33 Articles 8 and 11 codify the relevant rules pertaining to State 
responsibility for terrorist acts committed by private persons. Article 8 is the classic formulation 
of the de facto agency principle; it reads: ‘[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
30 Senate Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong, 1st Sess, Report on 
State-Sponsored Terrorism (Comm. Print 1985) (authored by R Cline and Y Alexander) 40.
31 Richard B Lillich & John M Paxman, ‘State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist 
Activities’ (1976) 26 American University Law Review 217, 221.
32
 The ILC is a body established by the UN General Assembly to make recommendations for the codification of 
customary international law.
33 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 53d Sess, 
Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) 44-45.
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considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.’34 Historically, the ILC has firmly insisted that in order to meet this test ‘it has to be 
effectively proved’ [in each and every case] that the person or persons ‘had really been charged 
by the State organs to carry out that specific act.’ 35
Article 11, in contrast, does not require proof of a State’s prior knowledge, and instruction or 
control of a terrorist act in order to attribute a private person’s conduct to the State. Under this 
rule, ‘conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless 
be considered an act of a State under international law if and to the extent that the State 
acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.’36  Elaborating on this rule, Scott M 
Malzahn notes that ‘[it] differs from the classic formulation of the de facto agency principle in 
that the private person is not acting on behalf of the State at the time of the act’s commission, 
rather State responsibility is based on the State identifying the conduct and either expressly or 
impliedly making the conduct its own at some later date.’37 A position consonant with ILC 
elaboration.38
In two different cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) applied and expanded on the tests 
found in Articles 8 and 11 to determine whether a State was responsible for criminal and terrorist 
activities committed by private persons. In the first case, entitled United States Diplomatic and 
34 Ibid at 45.
35 Luigi Condorelli, ‘The Imputability to States of Acts of International Terrorism’ (1990) 19 Israel Year Book of 
Human Rights 233, 239.
36 ILC Report, above n 32 at 45.
37
 Scott M Malzahn, ‘State Sponsorship and Support of International Terrorism: Customary Norms of State 
Responsibility (2002) 26 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 83, 98.
38 ILC Report, above n 32 at 122.
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Consular Staff in Tehran, the ICJ held that Iran was responsible for the taking of US hostages by 
private militants because the Iranian Government sanctioned and perpetuated the hostage crisis.39
Six years later in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ ruled that 
the United States was not responsible for the rebel activities of Nicaraguan Contras because 
evidence that the Contras were controlled and dependent on the United States was insufficient to 
establish that the United States directed the Contras’ each and every act.40 The ICJ ruled that US 
support for the Contras infringed on Nicaragua’s territorial sovereignty in contravention of 
international law,41 but concluded the evidence did not demonstrate the United States ‘actually 
exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its 
behalf.’42 In order to attribute the actions of the contras to the United States, the ICJ required 
proof in each instance that operations launched by the contras ‘reflected strategy and tactics 
solely devised by the United States.’43
‘Whereas the judgment in the Tehran Case was met with general approval and approbation, the 
Nicaragua decision was criticised for its “painstaking examination” of specific acts. The ICJ’s 
act-by- act approach to de facto agency, reflected in Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles requires 
proof of State authorisation of each and every act carried out by private persons before the 
conduct is attributed to the State.’44  In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ adopted an all or nothing 
approach to State responsibility. In the absence of sufficient proof to demonstrate the Contras 
39
 United States and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v Iran) 1980, ICJ 3, p 74 (24 May).
40 Nicaragua Case, above n 23.
41 Ibid at  108. 
42 Ibid  at 109.
43 Ibid at 109.
44
 Malzahn, above n 36 at 100-101. For a detailed exposition of this assertion, see Keith Highet, ‘Evidence, The 
Court, and the Nicaragua Case’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 1, 40-41; see also Francis V 
Boyle, ‘Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v United States (Merits)’ (1987) American Journal of 
International Law 86.
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were de facto agents of the US government, the United States escaped any responsibility for the 
contras’ actions.45 Despite the criticism of the case, one of its most important aspects was that the 
ICJ suggested that active support by a State constitutes a substantial degree of State control, 
which would be sufficient to legally charge a State for an ‘armed attack’ (as used in Article 51) 
committed by international terrorists within its borders.46
While State responsibility for terrorist activities actively supported by the State logically follows 
from the State’s complicity in the offence,47 more problematic is a State’s responsibility for acts 
of terrorism that it failed to prevent. A State is not expected to prevent every act of international 
terrorism that originates from within its territory. What is expected is that States exercise due 
diligence in the performance of their international obligations so as to take all reasonable 
measures under the circumstances to protect the rights and securities of other States. Professor 
Richard B Lillich, a leading publicist on international terrorism and State responsibility,48 agrees 
that customary international law expects States to prevent their territory from being used by 
terrorists for the preparation or commission of acts of terrorism against aliens within its territory 
or against the territory of another State.49
Concurring with Professor Lillich, the author asserts that under international law, States now are 
under a general duty to carry out prevention of terrorism by ‘due diligence,’ which means that all 
45 Mark Gibney et al, ‘Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights’ (1999) 12 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 267, 287.
46 See Gregory M Travalio, ‘Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force’ (2000), 18 Wisconsin 
International law Journal 144, 155.
47 See Lillich & Paxman, above n 30 at 236-237.
48
 The writings of widely respected publicists, so long as they reflect the actual status of the law rather than personal 
recommendations, are a subsidiary source of international law. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 
1945, art 38(1), 59 Stat 1055, TS No 993 at 1060.
49 See  Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds, 9th ed 1996), Vol I, § 127a; 
Lillich & Paxman, above n 30 at 245, 261.
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reasonable measures under the circumstances must be taken to prevent terrorist acts.50 The 
toleration by a State of the use of its resources for terrorist activity against foreigners also serves 
as a basis for liability under State responsibility principles.51 Indeed, it is rarely asserted that State 
acquiescence in or toleration of acts of international terrorism is lawful; States are more inclined 
to deny that the State’s action or inaction rises to the level of State support or that the alleged act 
of terror meets the legal definition of terrorism.
The ICJ jurisprudence discussed above and supported by writings of leading publicists leads the 
author to the position that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter implicitly prohibits State support of 
international terrorism by explicitly ordering all Member States to ‘refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’52 This 
implied prohibition it is argued was made express in 1970 when the General Assembly approved 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil 
strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or 
use of force . . . . Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or 
interfere in civil strife in another State.53
Unlike Article 2(4), which only requires that States refrain from the threat or use of force, the 
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations requires positive action on the part of the State so as 
50 Lillich & Paxman, ibid at 245-46.
51 Ibid at 257, 274.
52 UN Charter, art 2, para 4.
53 GA Res 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess, Supp No 28, at 123, UN Doc A/8028 (1970).
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not to acquiesce in or tolerate terrorist activities originating from within its territory. The 
authoritativeness of the Declaration under international law is championed by Scott M Malzhan 
who notes that although passed only once, some commentators regard the Declaration 
Concerning Friendly Relations as an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter because of the 
drafting committee’s mandate to restate the fundamental principles of international law.’54 In any 
case, there is a long-standing General Assembly practice of passing resolutions that condemn 
both active and passive State support of terrorism55 and in recent years, the Security Council 
stated that ‘all States shall [r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to 
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts …’56
Despite wide universal acceptance of terrorism as an international crime, the contentious issue 
revolves around the issue of acceptable and permitted countermeasures. This is especially so 
since the UN has generally treated the general subject of terrorism as a General Assembly issue. 
Specifically, the matter mainly fell within the jurisdiction of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the 
General Assembly. Through the Sixth Committee and other UN bodies, the UN has played a part 
in elaborating conventions addressing specific crimes committed by terrorists, although most of 
the Conventions omit the word ‘terrorism.’57 Though the goal of the General Assembly was to 
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56 UN SCOR, 56th Sess, 4385th mtg at 2, UN Doc S/RES1373 (2001); see also UN SCOR, 56th Sess, 4413th mtg at 
157-158, UN Doc S/RES1377 (2001); UN SCOR, 54th Sess, 4053rd mtg at 157-158, UN Doc S/RES1269 (1999).
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create a basis for universal jurisdiction over, and condemnation and criminalisation of, the types 
of crimes that terrorists commit it did not extend this to terrorism per se perhaps keen to ward off 
the intrusion of the Security Council which might have invoked its role as guardian of 
international peace and security-something that it eventually did in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks.58
Because there is no cohesive elaboration enumerating appropriate responses to terrorist acts in the 
international system,59 individual States, have developed internal mechanisms for dealing with 
terrorists through criminal laws.60 Frequently, these internal mechanisms are the result of treaty 
agreements.61 However the system remains weak owing to the reality that terrorists may evade 
capture in the same way other criminals do: by exploiting faulty extradition treaties and 
weaknesses in law enforcement.62 In addition to these realities the state-to-terrorist relationship 
can be protected at the discretion of the sponsor, thereby sheltering the perpetrator from 
immediate coercion and other legal claims offered by victim States. Since terrorism is 
ambiguous, its throws victim States off balance as they must grope for an appropriate means of 
response, or a determination if any response is appropriate.
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 1973, 1035e UNTS 167; See 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 206.
58 As a first step, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1368. The Resolution unequivocally condemned the 
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prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant 
international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions.’ SC Res 1368, UN SCOR, 56th Sess, 
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Coupled with the uncertain nature of permissible countermeasures against international terrorism 
within the international system, the efficacy of domestic criminal laws is weakened in the face of 
transnational terrorists groups whose membership and conspiracy may spread across many 
borders.63 The challenge to States and the international community is compounded when States 
actively or passively support terrorism thus enhancing the capabilities of terrorist organizations as 
well as their ability to avoid both domestic and international enforcement regimes paving way for 
impunity. Though traditionally State responsibility has been the vehicle through which pressure 
is exerted on States sponsoring terrorism, the lethal capabilities of terrorists demonstrated by the 
September 11, 2001 attacks has fundamentally changed the landscape. 
The attacks against the United States changed the context of UN activities. As noted above, the 
UN generally treated the general subject of terrorism as a General Assembly issue. After 
September 11, 2001, the Security Council weighed in on the matter and quickly became the locus 
of action. ‘That the larger world could not agree on a definition of terrorism or condemnation of 
terrorism in all circumstances became irrelevant.’64 Security Council Resolution 1368 
unequivocally condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11, called on all states to ‘work 
together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors’ of the attacks, and 
reaffirmed the inherent right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
‘Given the circumstances, this affirmation was significant: it implied that the attacks triggered the 
right even if, at the time of adoption, the UN Security Council knew almost nothing about who or 
what had launched them.’65
63
 Ibid at 134.
64
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This shift in the law is evident when one considers that in 1985, the international response to 
military strikes made by Israel in 1985 against Tunisia was strongly condemnatory. So much so 
that the Security Council in Resolution 573 condemned the air attack on PLO headquarters as an 
‘act of armed aggression . . . against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter.’66 This 
was despite Israel’s argument that Tunisia’s acts of harbouring, supplying, and assisting non-
State actors should be sufficient to attribute the acts of those non-State actors to it. Israel had 
accused Tunisia of harbouring individuals who had committed terrorist acts in Israel.67 The fact 
that Resolution 573 condemned Israel’s attack as contrary to the Charter implied that no 
justification based on self-defence was found. The claim of self-defence was subsequently also 
rejected by States as justification for the United States’ bombing of Tripoli (for a terrorist bomb 
in a Berlin nightclub) and the 1993 bombing of the Iraqi Secret Service (after an assassination 
attempt was made on former President George H W Bush in Kuwait).68
In an important departure from Resolution 573, the Security Council’s resolutions on 
Afghanistan explicitly mention the right of individual and collective self-defence and do not 
contain any condemnation of the military strikes. In view of the dangers posed by terrorism, 
broadening State responsibility and imposing severe punishment for breaches seems 
understandable however the issue is whether once responsibility is triggered by establishing that 
66
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the State in question knowingly tolerates the responsible parties, encourages them, or fails to do 
anything about them should this be followed up with the lethal use of force? While military 
action in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks drew favourable response to 
the use of force with America’s right of self-defence being mentioned in the same breath as 
terrorist attacks, the recent military action against Iraq in the aftermath of the  ‘Axis of Evil’ 
speech provoked strong reaction with its strong overtones of unilateral military action by the 
United States against countries that support terror notwithstanding United States insistence that 
the act was  a strategic imperative in its strategy of ‘offensive defence’.
The question that arises especially after the post-September 11 endorsements is: to what extent 
may a State lawfully respond with armed force against the State that has sponsored the terrorists 
deemed responsible for the attack? Under international law, the response of a targeted State is 
predicated on principles of self-defence, and these are in turn based on what the international 
community regards as the ‘inherent’ right to ensure national security and the attendant duty to 
protect one’s citizens from terrorist attacks.69 The norms of self-defence revolves around 
survival, and a State’s inherent right to protect and defend its sovereignty this in turn brings into 
play the UN Charter regime on the use of force vis-à-vis terrorism.
III. Terrorism Acts and the UN Charter Regime on Force
Until 1945, there was no customary prohibition on the unilateral resort to force if circumstances 
warranted it, and for signatories to particular instruments, if certain preliminary procedures had 
been exhausted, States reserved the right to resort to force. The UN Charter introduced to 
69 See generally UN Secretary General Affirms US Rights to Self-Defence (Oct. 2001) available at http:// 
usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01100903.htl.
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international politics a radically new notion: a general prohibition of the unilateral resort to force 
by States. The principle is encapsulated in its most authoritative form in Article 2(4) of the 
Charter. Pursuant to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, all members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force. Today Article 2(4) constitutes the basis of 
any discourse on the legitimacy of the use of force by States. Its predominant significance has 
been emphasized by authors who labelled it ‘the corner stone of peace in the Charter’, ‘the heart 
of the United Nations’ Charter basic rule of contemporary public international law’. The use of 
force in general is prohibited, rather than only war. The prohibition is not confined to the actual 
use of force, but extends to the mere threat of force.
The scope and content of the prohibition of the use of force in contemporary international law 
cannot be determined by an interpretation of Article 2(4) alone. Rather than standing by itself, 
Article 2(4) is part and parcel of a complex security system. The provision must be read in its 
context with Articles 39, 51, and 53.  Here the problem arises that those Articles contain a 
number of terms which, though related to one another, differ considerably in their meaning. The 
UN Charter uses the terms ‘attack’ or ‘aggression’ in Articles 1(l), 39, 51, and 53, albeit without 
defining them anywhere. Though the Security Council has the authority to make findings 
regarding threats to or breaches of international peace and security and authorise States to impose 
coercive sanctions or use armed force in response to any act of terrorism that violates Article 
2(4),70 neither legal writings nor State practices has so far clarified the threshold of these terms 
beyond doubt, nor have the attempts within the framework of the UN yet led to a satisfactory 
interpretation. Regardless of the uncertainties that accompany international law, and the 
frustrating impotence of the United Nations, the UN stands as the authoritative body that 
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continues to define conventional and customary standards for the use of force in international 
law.71 Contemporary law concerning the use of force abroad holds that self-defence is the only 
justification recognised for the resort to force.72 Thus, despite the widespread condemnation of 
international terrorism, and the threat it presents to the international community, the use of 
military force across international boundaries to counter terrorism is not necessarily permissible 
under international law,73 through terrorism may be equated with conventional war insofar as 
they both have parallel goals and rationales, i.e., attacking the political, social or economic 
structures of a given state.74 As in war, terrorists believe the enemy threatens their very existence 
and they accept the possibility of their own death in pursuit of the cause. The crucial difference is 
that in war, innocent civilians may not be used as targets for military victory, while terrorists 
freely choose from civilian targets. The problem for the State-centric regime on the use of force is 
that terrorist groups do not claim to represent or constitute internationally recognised States. The 
drafters of the Charter were concerned with a completely different set of problems--use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political integrity or political 
independence of another State. Further, the traditional theories of customary international law 
were developed in a completely different era, with no concern for the danger presented by a 
modern well-financed terrorist organisation in a world of chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons capable of horrific destruction, and yet portable by a single individual. A terrorist ‘war’ 
does not consist of a massive attack across an international border, nor does it consist of one 
isolated incident that occurs and is then past. It is a drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks.
71
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In view of the fact that terrorist groups may have reach and sophistication that is global, there is 
little doubt that international terrorism presents a threat that traditional theories for the use of 
military force are inadequate to deal with, and that were not contemplated at the time of the 
United Nations Charter.75 The first move to address force as a permissible countermeasure 
against terrorism within the purview of the international system arose from within the statal 
sphere. In the early 1980s, the US forcefully pronounced and expressly linked military responses 
to counter terrorism to international law. The move was clearly signalled amidst increased 
terrorist attacks against US interests and nationals. In the 1983, the Long Commission in 
commenting upon the devastating attack on the US Marine Headquarters in Beirut, concluded: 
[S]tate sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of warfare and … adequate response to 
this increasing threat requires an active national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its 
effectiveness. The Commission further concludes that this policy needs to be supported by political and 
diplomatic actions and by a wide range of timely military response capabilities.76
A year later, the then US President, Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision 
Directive (NSDD) which assigned responsibility for developing strategies for countering 
terrorism and made clear that, while the US must use all the non-military weapons in its arsenal 
to the fullest, it must also be prepared to respond within the parameters set by the law of armed 
conflict. Robert C McFarlane, a former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
suggested at a Defence Strategy Forum on March 25, 1985, that the directive supported resistance 
by force to State-sponsored terrorism ‘by all legal means.’77 The Vice President’s Task Force 
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refined this construct and explained that: ‘States that practice terrorism or actively support it will 
not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a State is mounting or intends to conduct 
an act of terrorism against this country, the United States will take measures to protect its 
citizens, property and interests.’78
Two years later, George Shultz, the US Secretary of State in what became known as the Shultz 
Doctrine asserted:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or 
airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or 
from using force against States that support, train, and harbour terrorists or guerrillas. International law 
requires no such result. A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or pre-empt 
future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens when no other means is available. The law 
requires that such actions be necessary and proportionate. But this nation has consistently affirmed the 
right of States to use force in exercise of their right of individual or collective self-defence.79
Despite the US’s forceful pronunciations backed by actual military responses to counter 
terrorism, from the international legal perspective, purported defensive responses to State-
sponsored terrorism need to be valid under customary and conventional legal requirements. 
Managing the terrorist threat posed by State sponsors requires identification of the threat, clear 
establishment of linkage to a State -sponsor and in the event of use of military force, the dual legal 
requirements of self-defence: necessity and proportionality ought to be met. The problem is that 
often responses to terrorism are coloured (negatively) by the reality that States intertwine 
responses with national interest. This reality weakens the substantive legal bases in international 
law that support military action despite frequent justifications that action is supported in 
customary international law by the inherent right of self-defence and a ‘realistic’ interpretation of 
78 Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, Public Report 2 (February 1986) [hereinafter cited as Public 
Report]. 7
79 Statement of Secretary of State George Shultz (15 January 1986).
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which takes into account modern weapons capabilities 
of today.
Any move to endorse the right of States to attack terrorist organisations located in other States 
with military force must necessarily be consistent with the requirements of Article 2(4). ‘Unless 
the level of support or control by the host State is such that the terrorists are mere proxies for the 
armed forces of the State, force cannot be used against facilities of the host country as a means of 
convincing the host country to stop its support of the terrorists, nor can force be used against 
facilities of the host country that only indirectly or collaterally support the terrorists.’80 To use 
force under these circumstances would amount to a breach of Article 2(4) which precludes the 
use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of the host country. State 
sponsored terrorism, is another matter. If terrorism is State sponsored, other nations can direct 
their response to terrorist attacks at the State itself (in addition to the terrorist groups). If it can be 
established that State-sponsored terrorism exists, then the sponsoring State may be in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits ‘Members’ of the United Nations from taking 
forcible action against the territorial integrity and political independence of other States. This 
Article has been interpreted to apply to non-Member States as well.81 That provision was applied 
by the UN Security Council in 1992 to impose economic sanctions on Libya for its connection 
with terrorist activities and for its refusal to extradite two Libyan nationals alleged to have 
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participated in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.82 The 
Resolution Stated: 
 [E]very State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts 
in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission 
of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force.83
In addition, the United Nations had this explication of State-sponsored terrorism affecting regions 
outside a State: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or 
armed bands including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State. Every State has the 
duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts 
in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission 
of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.84
This has been interpreted to constrain States from the maintenance of terrorist training camps in 
the techniques of assassination, destruction and sabotage, the collection of funds, directly or 
indirectly, providing of direct financing for training camps and other programs, the purchase of 
arms, ammunition and explosives and preparation of foreign propaganda.85 When the location of 
a terrorist or a terrorist base camp is known and the territorial State refuses to cooperate within 
the ‘extradite or prosecute’ framework laid down by international conventions,86 domestic law 
enforcement is completely ineffective in defending a State and its interests abroad. In this 
situation where States openly engage in, or support acts of violence and attacks on another State, 
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an appropriate response of the victim State may be the use of armed force.87 Although arguably 
effective and temporarily satisfying, the important concern is whether a policy of armed response 
is wise in view of its probable violation of international law. If a State concludes that an illegal 
use of force is too costly a response, the State is left with a limited array of alternatives for 
dealing with terrorist incidents. Countries are therefore in search of a permissible and effective 
response in order to thwart terrorism. That search has led to the use of Article 51 of the Charter, 
the claim of self-defence, as a way of legitimising the use of armed force. Article 51, the inherent 
right of self-defence in the face of an armed attack’ permits a victimised nation to engage in 
‘unilateral or collective self-defence until and unless the Security Council has addressed the 
issue. Nothing in the UN Charter restricts the identity of aggressors against whom States may 
respond, since private agents as well as governments may be the sources of aggression.
Self- Defence in the Context of Terrorism
Use of Article 51 to defend a State’s decision to use armed force against terrorists and terrorist 
havens is not novel. The Israelis used it in defence of its raid on Entebbe88 as did the United 
States in attempting to justify its bombing of Libya. Such claims did not win a favourable 
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response from the international community.89 ‘While the right of self-defence is referred to as 
being “inherent,” the UN Charter itself does not elaborate on what is meant by the use of the 
word “inherent.” It is clear that the word was intentionally used because the initial draft of Article 
51 did not contain “inherent” but was changed to make the right of self-defence explicitly 
inherent.’90 This has been interpreted by a number of international law scholars to mean that the 
right of self-defence is one which antedates and exists independently of the Charter.91 In contrast 
to international customary law, the Charter appears to have added a new requirement to the 
‘inherent’ right --the occurrence of an ‘armed attack.’ It is unclear whether this new criteria was 
intended to narrow the existing right of self-defence. Even if the addition of the words ‘armed 
attack’ do narrow the inherent right of self-defence, it is equally unclear how and to what extent 
they limit that right. There appears to be no discussion of the phrase ‘armed attack’ in the records 
of the San Francisco Conference. One explanation might be that the drafters felt the words 
themselves were sufficiently clear. Given that the main concern of the Charter is the unilateral 
use of force, the prerequisites of an actual attack by armed forces would severely limit such 
action. Therefore, the Charter may be interpreted as limiting the use of force to only those 
situations involving the most serious and dangerous form of threat to international peace.
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It is also significant that the drafters chose the word ‘attack’ over the term ‘aggression’ which is 
used repeatedly throughout the Charter. Under the Charter the term ‘aggression’ is undefined.92
Instead, it is up to the Security Council to determine on a case-by- case basis whether a particular 
action constitutes unlawful aggression. The drafters at the San Francisco Conference chose this 
more flexible system because ‘the progress of modern warfare...renders very difficult the 
definition of all cases of aggression.’93 We do not find, however, any evidence that such 
flexibility and subjectivity was to be accorded to the exercise of the right of self-defence. As 
Professor J E S Fawcett points out: 
It could be said that there is some evidence that the drafters of the Charter used the precise and restrictive 
notion of ‘armed attack’ in preference to ‘aggression’ or ‘threat to the peace,’ precisely because they 
wished to avoid giving too much latitude within the Charter system to the recognised right of self-defence 
. . .
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Though legality of the use of force under international law (jus ad bellum) is instructive in 
matters relating to State-sponsored terrorism the nature of terrorism renders this concept rather 
vague and blurred since terrorism does not fall easily into traditional principles of international 
law. Terrorists are not State actors bound by international law but rather they are similar to 
criminals in that they act outside of the scope of law.95  This condition presents States with an 
intractable problem: how to respond legally to groups who are not adhering to legal strictures. 
This problem is made all the more difficult when States actively or passively support terrorism. 
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The involvement of States in supporting terrorism brings into play the international regime on the 
use of force based on the UN Charter, as well as the concept of State responsibility. The 
tendency has been to draw a distinction between terrorist acts and acts which lead to an 
invocation of the use of force under the UN Charter. ‘If a terrorist attack occurs outside the 
borders of a group that is sponsored by a State, the question arises: to what extent may a State 
lawfully respond with armed force against the State that has sponsored the terrorists deemed 
responsible for the attack?’96 Reacting to this, J A Cohan opines that:
Under international law, the response of a targeted State is predicated on principles of self-defence, and 
these are in turn based on what the international community regards as the ‘inherent’ right of national 
security and the attendant duty to protect one’s citizens from terrorist attacks. The norms of self-defence 
revolve around survival, autonomy, and dignity, and are parallel to the common law of self-defence in 
Western jurisprudence. Clearly, we start with the principle that a State has the inherent right to protect and 
defend its sovereignty.97
It is arguable that well-organised terrorist groups with the means to reach across international 
borders to inflict significant damage on a country on an ongoing basis (such as Al Qaeda) must 
represent the sort of threat against which self-defence is legitimate if the doctrine is to have any 
practical contemporary value. There are no obvious examples of United Nations members 
claiming that the 1998 missile strikes against Al Qaeda camps could not be acts of self-defence 
because the alleged perpetrators of the embassy bombings were a non-State group. State practice 
would therefore seem to support the hypothesis that an Article 51 armed attack may be by a non-
State group. In any case, the symbiotic relationship of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Taliban 
meant that at least the Al Qaeda leadership could not be seen purely as a ‘non-State’ entity and 
that the Taliban shared significant responsibility for Al Qaeda’s actions in the 11 September 
attack. Depending on the factual circumstances, the definition of the terrorist acts of September 
96
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11 as ‘armed attack’ may not necessarily imply that the concept actually refers to acts that are 
attributable to a State. In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ gave a restrictive view of attribution when 
it found that there was ‘no clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a 
degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf.’98
In the face of the ever-increasing threat of terrorism and the inability to root out terrorist groups, 
States such as the United States and Israel have resorted to retaliatory strikes against terrorist 
cells located in sovereign States. These States contend that terrorist threats represent a legitimate 
justification for the use of force abroad. Others argue that the use of such force presents an even 
greater threat to community order and well being. The idea of strategic deterrence to deter future 
terrorist attacks is not without controversy considering that the Charter and customary 
international law authorise the use of force only for self-defence. When the UN Charter was 
drafted in 1945, the right of self-defence was the only included exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force though customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, and 
retribution as legitimate responses as well.99
 Reprisals and retaliatory strikes are illegal under contemporary international law because they 
are punitive, rather than legitimate, actions of self-defence.100 It would be difficult to conform 
acts of reprisal with the overriding dictate in the Charter that all disputes must be settled by 
peaceful means. Further, under the UN Charter regarding self-defence, there are three main 
principles that go into examining the jus ad bellum dimensions of a State’s response if it has 
98
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suffered a terrorist attack. These principles dealing with the timeliness of the response, and the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality are difficult to reconcile with retaliatory strikes. 
Indeed, the use of reprisals represents a regression to the just war theory, which was abandoned 
in the seventeenth century. The purpose of the United Nations is to limit the use of force in 
international matters and to provide a forum for the resolution of conflict in international matters 
so as to prevent the need for war. To permit reprisals would thwart the very goal to which States 
have committed themselves by membership in the UN.
In customary law, conventional law, and opinio juris, the practice of reprisals through the use of 
unilateral force has been denounced.101 A sharp distinction has also been drawn between the use 
of force in self-defence and its use in reprisals. The legal status of reprisals is stated very 
succinctly by Professor Ian Brownlie: ‘The provisions of the Charter relating to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and non-resort to the use of force are universally regarded as prohibiting 
reprisals which involve the use of force.’102 Since 1953, the use of force by way of reprisals has 
been strongly condemned by the United Nations as an illegal use of force under the Charter.103
The United Nations condemned Israel when it used force against Palestinians in Tunisia in 
retaliation for repeated terrorist attacks in 1985.104 It had the same response to Britain when it 
attacked Yemen for similar reasons in 1964.105 Though some in the international community 
would argue that reprisal action is inherent to maintaining security, most States condemn the 
practice.106
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Cast against the backdrop of brief survey above on the use of force to counter terrorism, the legal 
response to the September 11, 2001, attacks was unusual. The international community broadly 
qualified the September 11 attacks as ‘armed attacks’ against the United States, justifying the 
exercise of self-defence with quasi-unanimous statements of support coupled with offers of 
assistance to the US to facilitate the military action that soon followed.107 By reaffirming the 
‘inherent right of individual and collective self-defence’ in the preambles of Security Council 
Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001),108 the doctrine of self-defence clearly underlies the 
military strikes against the Taliban in 2001. The main question is how the events of September 11 
affect the interpretation of the armed attack requirement under the Charter. It is this difficult 
question that the Article now turns to consider in the next section.
Armed Attacks and Terrorism Acts
The prohibition of the use of force embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter not only 
proscribes war, but any use or threat of force in general.  Apart from the, now obsolete, clauses 
concerning the former enemy States, the UN Charter contains only two exceptions to the 
prohibition of force, namely Security Council enforcement actions pursuant to Chapter VII, and 
the right to individual and collective self-defence laid down in Article 51. As the system of 
collective security109 has been of little practical significance, international legal practice since 
1945, contrary to the intentions of the authors of the Charter, continues to be determined by the 
107 See Jack M Beard, ‘Military Action Against Terrorists Under International Law: America’s New War On 
Terrorism: The Case For Self-Defence Under International Law,’ (2002) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
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unilateral use of force by States. Yet in this respect the Charter provides in Article 51 for an 
exclusive regulation, allowing individual States the threat or use of force only under the 
conditions stipulated there.110 The right of self-defence laid down in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, being the only exception to the prohibition of force of practical significance, is therefore 
the pivotal point upon which disputes concerning the lawfulness of the use of force in, inter-state 
relations usually concentrate. Commenting on the practical implications of Article 51, Professor 
Ian Brownlie explains that:
 [i]t is believed that the ordinary meaning of the phrase precludes action which is preventive in character. 
In this respect the French text is less equivocal than the English since its literal translation would read in a 
case where a United Nations Member is the object of an armed aggression.  The Spanish text simply reads 
‘en caso de ataque armado’. There is no further clarification of the phrase to be gained from study of the 
travaux preparatoires.  However, the discussions at San Francisco assumed that any permission for the 
unilateral use of force would be exceptional and would be secondary to the general prohibition in Article 
2, paragraph 4. There was a presumption against self-help and even action in self-defence within Article 
51 was made subject to control by the Security Council. In these circumstances the precision of Article 51 
is explicable.111
A major question is whether the right of self-defence under Article 51 is limited to cases of armed 
attack or whether there are other instances in which self-defence may be available under Article 
51. A number of commentators argue that the right to use force in self-defence under Article 51 is 
not limited to cases of armed attack.112  As Professor G M Travalio observes, 
[t]hese commentators generally argue that the intention of the drafters of the United Nations Charter was 
to incorporate into Article 51 all of the rights of self-defence that existed in customary international law at 
110
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the time of the Charter In addition, the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case, indicated that 
the right of self-defence in Article 51 simply recognised a pre-existing right of customary international 
law.113
Because the customary right of self-defence, so the argument goes, includes instances in addition 
to an armed attack, military force may be legally available as an option against terrorists even if 
an armed attack has not occurred. This view holds that the presence of an armed attack is one of 
the bases for the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51, but not the exclusive 
basis.114 Professor Oscar Schacter sums up this position thus: 
On one reading [of Article 51] this means that self-defence is limited to cases of armed attack. An 
alternative reading holds that since the Article is silent as to the right of self-defence under customary law 
(which goes beyond cases of armed attack) it should not be construed by implication to eliminate that right 
... It is therefore not implausible to interpret Article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defence as it 
existed prior to the Charter.115
A significant number of writers argue that an armed attack is the exclusive circumstance in which 
the use of armed force is sanctioned under Article 51.116 In fact, Professor Yoram Dinstein has 
gone so far as to State that ‘the leading opinion among scholars’ is that the right of self-defence 
in Article 51 does not extend beyond armed attack.117 Furthermore, the International Court of 
Justice in Nicaragua Case clearly stated that the right of self-defence under Article 51 only 
accrues in the event of an armed attack.118 Also, it is a traditional requirement of self-defence that 
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a triggering event justifying a military response have already occurred or at least be imminent.119
Summing up these arguments, Professor G M Travalios concludes that 
… it is generally believed that the right of self-defence, even if it extends beyond the ‘armed attack’ of 
Article 51, does not permit the use of force to punish an aggressor after a threat has passed, nor does it 
permit the use of force to deter a less than imminent threat. The basis in international law for this 
limitation is the famous Caroline case.120
Apart from reference to phrases in Article 2(4) to which it is sought to give a restricted meaning, 
it can be argued that Article 51 and paragraph 4 of Article 2 were not intended to, and do not 
restrict the right of Member States to use force in self-defence within the meaning of that concept 
to be found in the customary law. 
Article 51, it is said, refers merely to ‘armed attack’ because it was inserted for the particular 
purpose of clarifying the position of defence treaties which are concerned only with external 
attack, and being in this way specific it leaves the broader customary right, which is always 
implicitly reserved, intact. Professor Derek Bowett’s view supports the position that Article 2, 
paragraph 4, left the right of self-defence unimpaired and that the right implicitly excepted was 
not confined to reaction to ‘armed attack’ within Article 51 but permitted the protection of certain 
substantive rights:
Action undertaken for the purpose of, and limited to, the defence of a State’s political independence, 
territorial integrity, the lives and property of its nationals (and even to protect its economic independence) 
cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force ‘against the territorial integrity or political 
‘independence’ of any other State.121
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Richard Erickson, in his monograph on international terrorism and the use of military force, 
states that ‘the traditional view is that State toleration or encouragement is an insufficient State 
connection’ to constitute an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter.122 This position is 
shared by a number of other commentators and can be readily supported by arguments distilled 
from provisions in the UN Charter.123 If the right of self-defence extends beyond the ‘armed 
attack’ provision of Article 51, there are, at the very least, serious hurdles that must be overcome 
before self-defence, as traditionally understood, can be used to justify attacks against terrorists or 
terrorist facilities located in another State. 
The recognition that acts of private actors may give rise to an armed attack is anything but 
revolutionary. The term ‘armed attack’ was traditionally applied to States, but nothing in the 
Charter indicates that ‘armed attacks’ can only emanate from States. The main question is 
whether a terrorist act must be in some form attributable to another State in order to qualify as an 
armed attack. It is not entirely clear from the practice in the aftermath of September 11 whether 
the requirement of the attributability of a terrorist act to a specific State actor was, in fact, fully 
abandoned. NATO, for instance, introduced an interesting new formula when determining 
whether the September 11 attacks amounted to ‘armed attacks.’ It did not expressly inquire 
whether the attacks were ‘attributable’ to the Taliban or Afghanistan, but instead asked whether 
‘the attack against the United States on September 11 was directed from abroad’ and could 
‘therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.’124
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It may be of greater consequence to admit openly that the requirement of attributability does not 
play a role in the definition of armed attack. A similar argument can be made with regard to 
armed attacks under Article 51. One may argue that the criterion of the attributability of an armed 
attack is only relevant in the context of the question towards whom the forcible response may be 
directed, but not in the context of the definition of an armed attack. Carsten Stahn postulates that 
‘… the main criteria to determine whether a terrorist attack falls within the scope of application 
of Article 51 would not be attributability, but whether the attack presents an external link to the 
State victim of the attack.’ 
Reviewing the relationship between article 2 (4) and article 51 vis-à-vis other coercive uses of 
force, Professor Myres McDougal states: 
Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and use of force and commits the Members to refrain from ‘threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;’ the customary right of defence, as limited by the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent with the purpose of 
the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness would suggest that a conception of 
impermissible coercion, which includes threats of force, should be countered with an equally 
comprehensive and adequate conception of permissible or defensive coercion …125
In an exposition of the significance of Professor McDougal’s statement, Lieutenant Colonel 
James P Perry notes that:
…in Professor McDougal’s interpretation is the recognition of the right to counter the imminent threat of 
unlawful coercion as well as an actual attack. This comprehensive conception of permissible or defensive 
coercion, honouring appropriate response to threats of an imminent nature, is merely reflective of the 
customary international law. It is precisely this anticipatory element of lawful self-defence that is critical 
to an effective policy to counter State-sponsored terrorism.126.
Secretary of State Shultz emphasized this point when he said: ‘The UN Charter is not a suicide 
pact. The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent … There 
should be no confusion about the status of nations that sponsor terrorism against Americans and 
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American property.’127 The premise of this contention is that self-defence is an inherent right 
whose contours have been shaped by custom and subject to customary interpretation. Thus 
although the drafters of Article 51 may not have anticipated its use in protecting States from the 
effects of terrorist violence, international law recognises the need for flexible application if the 
constitutive nature of the UN Charter is to have any meaning
Even though the language of Article 51 may be thought to lend itself to an expansive 
interpretation, so that in today’s world, with today’s military capabilities, the manner in which a 
State protects itself from suffering a further terrorist attack must be flexible, this would allow any 
State, once a terrorist ‘attack occurs’ or is about to occur, to use force against those responsible 
for the attack in order to prevent the attack or to deter further attacks unless reasonable ground 
exists to believe that no further attack will be undertaken.’128 Though self-defence by the drafters 
of the UN Charter was addressed in the context of large-scale attacks by the regular armed forces 
of one State against (the territory of) another, not the mere harbouring or a terrorist group, it can 
be argued that given the radically different contemporary realities compared to 1949, Article 51 
needs to be interpreted more broadly. Considering that the preferred modus operandi of terrorist 
organisations is drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks, it is very difficult to know when 
or where the next incident will occur. This state of affairs was simply not contemplated at the 
time the UN Charter  was drafted. As observed by Professor G M Travalio:
… reasonable arguments can be made that the definition of ‘armed attack’ should be interpreted to include 
the purposeful harbouring of international terrorists. The potential destructive capacity of weapons of mass 
destruction, the modest means required to deliver them, and the substantial financial resources of some 
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terrorist organizations, combine to make the threat posed by some terrorist organizations much greater 
than that posed by the militaries of many States.129
The UN was founded on the unfulfilled promise that the UN Security Council would protect 
international peace and security in return States would forgo self-help in favour of collective-
help. The reality is that the UN Charter system is not strongly coherent or controlling. It is 
arguable that in the face of the reality of the alleged weaknesses of the UN system in 
guaranteeing peace and security, the right of self-defence under Article 51 ought be read to 
include all of the rights of self-defence that existed in customary international law at the time it 
was drafted.130 And the customary right of self-defence has included instances in which military 
force might be legally appropriate as self-defence, even when no armed attack has occurred.131
The fact however is that unseating regimes that adopt terror as a tool of statecraft is not supported 
by existing current legal doctrines governing the use of force nor does the international system 
adequately account for the threat posed by such States. 
Before 11th September 2001, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations on individual or 
collective self-defence was generally interpreted in a restrictive fashion. Most States (with the 
exception of the United States and Israel) did not recognise a right of self-defence against 
terrorist networks hiding in territories of other States; nor did a majority of States recognise the 
legitimacy of military action intended to prevent future attacks. Self-defence was seen as an 
action of immediate response to an ongoing armed attack. Preventive or anticipatory self-defence 
was more or less ruled out. However, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a 
turning point in the international regime on the use of force. The world community came to 
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understand terrorism as an act of war-a new manifestation of the changing nature of armed 
conflict. As such, it poses not only new challenges for the historically fixed international rules 
relating to armed conflict but it also demands the development of new legal regimes which can 
effectively address the threat of global terrorism. This is necessary in view of the international
community largely assenting to the invocation of self-defence and thus in essence characterising 
the attacks as armed attacks. This characterization evoked a legal basis for the use of force 
initiated by the United States and United Kingdom against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. 
When stating the conditions for individual and collective self-defence, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter does not specify that an ‘armed attack’ has to originate from a State. However, this 
condition may be taken as implicit. The provision deals with international relations and envisage 
an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force against States. Moreover, armed attack 
is a subcategory of aggression, as explicitly said in the French text of Article 51 of the Charter,
and also aggression clearly has to come from a State (see Article I of the definition of aggression 
annexed to GA resolution 3314(XXIX)). There has been some academic debate as to whether the 
concept of ‘armed attack’ as contained in Article 51 must originate from a State (government) 
rather than a non-State actor like Al Qaeda. 
Security Council resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001 is ambiguous on the issue. In its 
preamble, the resolution ‘recogni[ses] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter’, but in the operative part of the resolution describes the attacks as 
‘terrorist attacks’ (not armed attacks) which ‘represent a threat to international peace and 
security’. In summary, the resolution does not explicitly recognise that the right of self-defence 
applies in relation to any parties as a consequence of the 11 September attacks. 
42
When a State harbouring132 terrorists provides active support for the terrorist group, as 
distinguished from mere tolerance and encouragement, there is a raging debate among 
international lawyers over whether, and under what circumstances, such support can constitute an 
‘armed attack’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter against the target State. On this point there is 
considerable authority for the proposition that under some circumstances active support to 
terrorist groups can constitute an ‘armed attack’ against another State. For example, Professor 
Oscar Schacter has stated: 
[W]hen a government provides weapons, technical advice, transportation, aid and encouragement to 
terrorists on a substantial scale, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an armed attack is imputable to the 
government.133
The Nicaragua Case134 decided by the International Court of Justice in 1986, is the closest case 
on this issue. In this case, the Court rejected the claim of the United States that the support of 
Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador justified the use of force by the United States against 
Nicaragua in self-defence under Article 51. The Court said clearly that the provision of weapons 
or logistical support by one State to the opposition in another State is not an armed attack under 
Article 51.135 Consequently, this opinion suggests, although does not decide, that even the active 
support by a State to terrorist groups would not be an armed attack under Article 51. The 
Nicaragua Case, however, is far from directly on point and leaves many questions unanswered. 
132 Harbouring entails providing sanctuary and training to international terrorists as well as conditions that support 
their ability to engage in terrorist activities. See eg  SC Res 1193, 391st mtg at 1, UN S/RES/1193 (1998). SC Res 
1214, 4053d mtg at 1, UN SCOR, 4051st mtg at 1, UN S/RES/1214 (1998)
133
 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another Country’ reprinted in Henry 
H Han, Terrorism and Political Violence (1993) 250. See Alberto Coll, ‘The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military 
Responses to Terrorism’ (1987) 81 Proceedings of the American Society on International Law 297, 298.
134 1986 ICJ 14
135
 Ibid at 119, para 30. 
43
For example, what if the support includes not only weapons and logistical support, but includes 
the provision of training and a secure base of operations? Does it change matters if the terrorists 
might have access to weapons of mass destruction? Might support to terrorists acting trans-
nationally be sufficient to be an armed attack against a target State even though support to an 
armed opposition located within the target country would not? None of these questions is 
addressed by the Nicaragua Case. Professor Rosalyn Higgins indicates that if the support reaches 
a sufficient scale, it can constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 51.136 Other 
commentators as well support the idea that the level of support to terrorist groups can rise to a 
level sufficient to become an armed attack under Article 51.137
The distinction between armed attacks and terrorist acts has become blurred in the aftermath of 
the acts that took place on September 11, 2001 possibly because of the enormous consequences. 
By ‘recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter’ a preambular paragraph of SC resolution 1368 appeared to imply that the terrorist acts in 
New York, Washington and Pennsylvania represented an ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. A similar preambular paragraph was also included in Resolution 
1373. The point that an armed attack occurred was more explicit in the statement made by the 
North Atlantic Council on September 12th. This said that, ‘if it is determined that this attack was 
directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which States that an armed attack against one or more of the 
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Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’.138 Neither the 
Security Council resolutions nor the NATO statement attempted to establish a link between the 
terrorist acts and a particular State. However, these texts do not provide a clear indication 
whether they intend to refer to a wide concept of armed attack which would comprise also acts 
which are not attributable to a State. The issue whether the acts in question could be regarded as 
State acts depends on factual elements which are still controversial. 
The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon seemed to create a political 
will to adapt the concept of self-defence to a new threat-the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks 
against nations as such. For traditional self-defence scenarios, the restrictive interpretation of 
Article 51 would still be valid, but in defence of ‘open societies’ against the new threat there was 
a widespread feeling among political decision-makers that preventive military action should no 
longer be ruled out. Through a process of State practice between 12th September and 10th 
October-which included UN Security Council Resolutions, NATO Declarations, supportive 
statements by the European Union, and a declaration by the Organization of Islamic States-the 
traditional rule of self-defence was extended. Particularly important was the meeting of the UN 
Security Council on 8th October. The Council had met to receive information on and discuss the 
US-UK bombings of targets in Afghanistan which had started on the preceding day. In a 
statement by the President of the Council, it was underlined that the military action had been 
reported to the Council as measures of self-defence (in accordance with the requirement of 
Article 51 that actions in self-defence should be so reported). ‘The members of the Council were 
appreciative of the presentation made by the United States and the United Kingdom.’ No member 
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of the Council, the most important body of the international community, objected to the new 
interpretation of Article 51. 
IV. Conclusion
As a matter of public international law, terrorism presents several problems: the identification of 
terrorists is often difficult; the inconsistent international legal system fails to deter terrorist 
operations; and the complicated cross-border nature of terrorist networks makes it difficult to 
effectively diminish the threat. In the face of these problems, States that are targeted by terrorists 
have essentially two options in responding against terrorists. If the terrorists are located within 
the target State’s borders, they may be captured and prosecuted under domestic criminal laws. 
However, as is frequently the case, if terrorists are located outside the target State, military strikes 
against them may be undertaken but this frequently involves incursions into neutral sovereign 
States.  Though it is clear that effective deterrence demands that terrorists do not have safe 
havens and that terrorists must fear that they ultimately will pay a price for their criminal 
mayhem, there is no indication that the world community is prepared to accept the use of force 
against sovereign territories in pursuit of modern terrorists since fundamental principles of the 
international system will be breached.
The significance of September 11 is the seeming official recognition by States that acts of 
terrorism carried out by independent private actors fit (somewhat uneasily) within the parameters 
of Article 51. But the events of September 11 have another more profound impact on the law of 
self-defence--they affect the system itself. ‘They will most likely strengthen the role of Article 51 
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as a new Grundnorm governing the unilateral use of force by States against armed violence.’139
The consequence is a wider concept of armed attack based on an eased nexus requirement 
concerning the act of terrorism to State actors. This relaxation will, in the long run, lead to an 
increasing invocation of Article 51 and to an extension of the scope of Article 51.140 ‘The other 
implication is a growing focus on the use of force in response to violence on Article 51. The 
lowered threshold for attributing terrorist acts to non-State actors will push States to rely on 
Article 51 to justify military means, rather than invoke a right to self-defence under customary 
law or the existence of a State of necessity.141
In principle, the growing centralisation of the system around Article 51 is a desirable 
development. An expansion of Article 51 is preferable to the creation of unwritten exceptions 
under the Charter because it does not further erode the prohibition of the use of force under 
Article 2(4), but simply opens a broader spectrum of justifications for what continues to be 
unlawful conduct under Article 2(4). A broadening of the ‘law of justification’ is much less 
detrimental to the regulatory framework of the Charter than a limitation of its prohibitory
character. In addition, Article 51 presents the decisive advantage of containing inherent limits to 
self-defence, leaving less room for abuse than an (unlimited) exception to Article 2(4). In the 
enthusiastic words of Carsten Stahn:
On a more general level, the broadening of the notion of armed attack to include acts of terrorism by non-
State actors such as al-Qaeda may…be viewed as a recognition of the adaptability of the system from 
within. It avoids the perpetuation of the Kosovo dilemma, namely, the emergence of categories of uses of 
force that may be said to be ‘illegal but justifiable’ while further isolating the ‘Glennonists’ of 
international law, who call into question the viability of the Charter rules on the use of force. 
Moreover, many of the dangers of a broad definition of the notion of ‘armed attack’ may 
be attenuated by a reasonable application of the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, which are the cornerstones of the permissibility of the use of force in 
self-defence.142
Conceptually, there is little dispute concerning the right to exercise the doctrine of self-defence. 
The difficulty lies in the determination of those conditions which justify the use of military 
139 Carsten Stahn, ‘ Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defencse, Article 51 (1/2) of the UN 
Charter, and International Terrorism’ (2003) 27 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35, 37.
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power. This requires an assessment of whether there is actual necessity, whether there is 
demonstrable justification, and whether the military instrument can be used in a manner 
proportionate to the threat. It is suggested that self-defence claims must be appraised in the total 
context in which they occur. One aspect of this contextual appraisal of necessity, especially as it 
relates to responding after-the-fact to terrorist violence, concerns the issue of whether force can 
be considered necessary if peaceful measures are available to lessen the threat. Once a terrorist 
attack has occurred, the military response should meet the legal criteria of necessity and 
proportionate use of force. After all, no State is obliged to ignore an attack as irrelevant, and the 
imminent threat to the lives of its nationals as well as its role as guarantor of national security for 
the well being of its citizenry.
Whatever the particular circumstances, policy makers and lawyers must keep in mind that there 
are significant potential dangers in expanding the category of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 beyond 
its obvious meaning of a direct attack by the military of one State against the territory, property, 
or population of another. It does seem to stretch the common understanding of the term to 
suggest that a State has committed an ‘armed attack’ against another by tolerating persons on its 
soil who are, in one view, nothing more than criminals. Too loose a definition of ‘armed attack’ 
invites future abuse and undermines the predictability of international law regarding the use of 
force. Moreover, while the right of self-defence, even against armed attack, is subject to 
limitations of proportionality and necessity, it is generally accepted that self-defence against an 
armed attack includes both a right to repel the attack and in limited cases to take the war to the 
aggressor State to prevent a recurrence.
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While the terrorist threat posed by biological, chemical or nuclear attacks is chilling, pre-emptive 
use of military action opens a Pandora’s box.143 Intervention to prevent the sinister marriage of 
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction presents serious legitimacy questions.  It 
is not necessarily in the interest of the international community to make the category of ‘armed 
attack’ under Article 51 so broad and potentially open-ended that nations harbouring groups 
committing violent acts in other States will be considered to have made armed attacks on the 
target State. Further, the scope of a nation’s permissible military response is almost certainly 
greater in the event of an ‘armed attack’ by another State than in other situations in which a more 
limited military response might be justified, and a broad definition of ‘armed attack,’ to include 
those situations in which a State merely harbours terrorists, would too readily justify the robust 
use of military force. While the language of Article 51 might be given an expansive 
interpretation, so that in today’s world, with increased terrorist capabilities, the manner in which 
a State protects itself from suffering a further attack might be made flexible, allowing States to 
act militarily, once a terrorist ‘attack occurs’ or is about to occur, the use of force against those 
responsible for attacks in order to prevent the attack or to deter further attacks without sufficient, 
recognised benchmarks will set dangerous precedent. 
143 The US intervention in Iraq constituted a paradigm-altering event. Even though the United States resorted to tired 
political games of legal rationalisation. The legality of its behaviour premised on the ‘Bush Doctrine’ remains in 
serious doubt.
